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Not a week goes by, it seems, without politicians or security experts raising 
fears about new threats of terrorism. Security has never been taken more seriously 
than in the wake of the September 11 disaster. The events have transformed most of 
the world’s society more than anybody could have imagined. At the forefront of this 
transformation process is the maritime industry, which, perhaps, is experiencing more 
radical change than any other industry.1 For good reason: most of the world’s cargo 
is still transported by ship. Consequentially, shipping is a possible target for attacks 
aimed at the weakening of a functioning economic system. In this connection, the 
vulnerability of ports is often criticised, especially considering the trend to megaports2 
and megavessels3. Therefore, measures already adopted to combat violence and 
crime at sea needed to be reviewed internationally. On the other hand, not only the 
law regarding port and ship security had to be rethought, but also regulations ad-
dressing cargo security in order to illuminate the whole chain involved in the act of 
transport. That seems essential in the light of the risk presented by containerised 
shipping.4 This paper examines the legal issues surrounding the prevention of mari-
time terrorism, looks at the new developments in the international legislation, consid-
ering especially IMO and American initiatives with their important impacts on interna-
tional shipping and highlights the influence of these measures on both the relation 
between shipowners and charterers regarding certain clauses of charterparties, as 
well as the relation between the carrier and cargo in respect if the carriage of goods 
by sea and the possibility to limit liability.    
                                            
1 Robert G. Clyne, Terrorism and Port/Cargo Security: Developments and Implications for Marine 
Cargo Recoveries. Tulane Law Review Vol.77, p. 1184. 
2 See John G. Fox, Sea Change in Shipping. U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, May 2001, 65, defining 
megaports by their ability to efficiently handle large volumes of containers with minimum quay length 
of 330 meters, at least 15 meters deep, and special heavy lift cranes.  
3 There are plans for vessels carrying up to 15,000 containers. See Justin S.C. Mellor, Missing the 
Boat: The Legal and Practical Problems of the Prevention of Maritime Terrorism. American Univer-
sity International Law Review Vol.18, p. 351. 
4 Approximately two hundred million containers are moved between ports annually. See ibid p. 351, 
352.  
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B. Security Problems in International Shipping 
Before dealing with the diverse regulations regarding security in shipping, we 
have to focus on the distinct, yet related, risk factors. These are on one hand the 
cargo and the vessels themselves, and on the other hand the people and companies 
associated with shipping. 
I. Containerization 
Over the last decades, the economic necessity led to a vast improvement in 
the handling of maritime cargo. In the mid-1950s Malcolm McLean, owner of a North 
Carolina trucking firm, built up a small shipping line and implemented a system of 
“containerization”.5 By moving the entire trailer instead of individual packages, the 
goods would only have to be handled twice and therefore much more effectively and 
safer. Using the old break bulk method, it often took days to load and unload ships. 
This process was simplified tremendously by the utilization of standardised boxes. As 
a result, port fees were reduced and the ships were able to make faster circuits. To-
day, most of the world’s non-bulk cargo is transported in marine shipping containers. 
A fleet of over 2700 modular container vessels are cruising at the world’s oceans. In 
2002, the Bureau International of the Container (BIC) estimated that approximately 
15.000.000 containers were in circulation – almost evenly shared between the self-
owned and leased fleet.6  
However, it is the efficiency of containerised systems, and the staggering vol-
ume of containers, that pose big challenges from a security perspective. A typical 
journey using a shipping container will involve the interaction of approximately 25 dif-
ferent actors, generate 30-40 different documents, use 2-3 different modes and be 
handled at as many as 12-15 physical locations.7 The chain includes the transport by 
road/train, either directly to the port or to an intermediary’s premises, staging areas in 
the ports before the containers are moved next to the vessel at the quay, tranship-
                                            
5 Mark L. Chadwin et Al.: Ocean Container Transportation, 1990. p. 1-2. The idea for containers al-
ready came up in 1937. However, only in 1956, McLean converted a World War II tanker named 
Ideal X to carry freight by rigging containers on the ship’s deck. The new system proofed successful 
and he subsequently changed the name of the company to Sea-Land Service Inc. The company de-
veloped into the world’s largest container shipping lines. 
6 OECD. Directorate for Science, Technology and Industry: Security in Maritime Transport: Risk Fac-
tors and Economic Impact. July 2003. p. 7.  
7 See ibid at p. 24.   
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ments in another port onto another vessel before arriving at its destination port, tem-
porary storage areas and carriage by road/rail or inland waterway to the final destina-
tion. Such a logistic chain is not uniformly secure and the level of protection of the 
containers and their contents can vary immensely from node to node. However, the 
risk of security breaches at any of its links compromises the security of the whole 
chain. There are literally thousands of “entry points” along modern logistic chains that 
could be exploited by terrorist. Furthermore, perpetrators could take advantage of the 
anonymity of the whole system. Cargo can rarely be inspected and the only parties 
that know of the content are the shipper and the recipient. Consequently, there is no 
knowledge of what a ship brings into a country or what exactly is sitting on quays at 
major seaports for the purposes of import and export. In a worst case scenario8, a 
terrorist organization could pack a global positioning satellite-enabled weapon of 
mass destruction within a shipping container, introduce it into the international trans-
port system using legitimate shippers, intermediaries and carriers, and remotely 
detonate the weapon upon its arrival in the heart of a major population or economic 
centre. All that would be required is a weapon, a few well-placed agents and a basic 
understanding of international trading practises.9 The ease with which the container 
transport system can be subverted became apparent in the southern Italian port of 
Gioia Tauro when port authorities discovered a stowaway within a well-appointed 
shipping container complete with bed, heater toilet facilities, lap-top, satellite phone 
etc.. It could only be discovered because the stowaway attempted to widen the venti-
lation holes when port workers were nearby.10  
Accordingly, the system is porous enough that it can relatively easy be sub-
verted from legitimate commercial purposes. However, the vulnerability in the mari-
time sector is in many respects a product of the success of free trade and liberalized 
economic policies. It will be examined later on, if efforts to increase regulatory en-
forcements at ports and borders may result in a cure that is worse than the disease.11  
                                            
8 It is not the aim of that paper to line out hypothetical terrorist scenarios. However, it seems to be in-
dispensable to show at least some possibilities in order to discuss an effective preventive system.     
9 See  OECD. Directorate for Science, Technology and Industry: Security in Maritime Transport: Risk 
Factors and Economic Impact. July 2003. p. 7-8. 
10 See ibid at p. 9. 
11 Stephen E. Flynn: Beyond Border Control. Foreign Affairs Nov./Dec. 2000. p. 58.  
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II. Vessels 
The most obvious risk is the lack of security onboard the vessels themselves. 
There is a potential for an entire vessel to be used as a weapon such as the attack of 
port facilities or population centres adjacent to the ports, or the blocking of the access 
to ports by sinking vessels.12 On the other hand, previous incidents have tended to 
target the vessels rather than use them. The boarding of the cruise vessel Achille 
Lauro, the suicide attacks against the U.S.S. Cole, while docked in the port of Aden, 
and the oil tanker Limberg, and the discovery of an Al’Qaeda linked plot to attack 
vessels passing through the straights of Gibraltar, all point to the risk of attack faced 
by vessels.13  
III. Seafarers 
There are approximately 1.227.000 officers and ratings manning the merchant 
fleet.14 Not all of them operate on international trading vessels but a significant por-
tion do. Seafarers have traditionally been granted relatively liberal travel rights by 
governments through non-immigrant crew list visas, or simply upon their presentation 
of their seafarer identity documents.15 However, there is very little known about the 
men who operate the vessels. Any background checks prior to employment on board 
a ship is the legal responsibility of the flag state.16 One of the great attractions of 
“Flags of Convenience” is that they allow vessels owners to crew the ship with foreign 
nationals as a means to control costs. The employment of a large number of foreign 
nationals makes the implementation of enhanced reliability checks nearly impossi-
ble.17 This creates gaps that could be utilized by perpetrators in order to obtain em-
                                            
12 See  OECD. Directorate for Science, Technology and Industry: Security in Maritime Transport: Risk 
Factors and Economic Impact. July 2003. p. 12. 
13 Ibid p. 12. 
14 Total seafarers in 2000 according to the BIMCO/ ISF Manpower Update Report.  
15 See  OECD. Directorate for Science, Technology and Industry: Security in Maritime Transport: Risk 
Factors and Economic Impact. July 2003. p. 14. 
16 Art. 94(1) UNCLOS imposes the obligation that “[e]very State shall effectively exercise its jurisdiction 
and control in administrative, technical and social matters over ships flying its flag.” That includes 
manning requirements and background checks for crew members.  
17 H. Edwin Anderson: The Nationality of Ships and Flags of Convenience: Economics, Politics and 
Alternatives. 21 Tulane Maritime Law Journal 1996. p. 163. 
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ployment with an overseas shipping company and thereby support their logistic op-
erations.           
IV. Ownership and Control of Ships 
It is beneficial shipowners that decide how their vessel will be used, or at least 
remain responsible for the use to which their vessels are put. They are the ultimate 
beneficiaries of the revenue generated by the vessel they own. These ships can, as 
described above, be used to facilitate, fund or execute acts of terror. Of course, in 
numerous cases innocent shipowners could be unaware that their vessels could be 
used for such purposes. However, on many occasions terrorist related activities, es-
pecially those that may be complex or logistically difficult, could only be successfully 
handled with the knowledge and/or agreement of the owners.18   
To these ends, there are numerous possibilities to cover their identities as 
beneficial owners for perpetrators that seek to get involved in shipping. Transparency 
in shipping does hardly exist. In fact, anonymity seems to be the rule rather than the 
exception. Owners may seek anonymity for a variety of reasons, legal or otherwise, 
that have nothing to do with security. However, regardless of the reason why the 
cloak of anonymity is made available, if it is provided it will also be used by those who 
may wish to remain hidden because they engage in illegal or criminal activities.19 
It is the ship registration process that causes a lack of transparency. In order 
to operate internationally a vessel must be registered in a recognized ship register. In 
effect the state of registration will then become the ship’s “flag State”. The UN Law of 
the Sea Convention20 regulates the flag State’s obligations and responsibilities to-
wards the ship carrying its flag in Art. 91-94. However, the Convention is, apart from 
noting that there “must exist a genuine link between the State and the ship” in Art. 91 
UNCLOS, silent on ownership requirements. That concept was also used in the 1986 
UN Convention on the Registration of Ships, which has never come into force, be-
cause it has failed to achieve the required number of accessions and ratifications.21 
Its objective was to strengthen the link between the nationality of a ship and the state 
                                            
18 OECD. Directorate of Science, Technology and Industry: Ownership and Control of Ships. March 
2003. p. 6. 
19 Ibid p. 7. 
20 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (Montego Bay, December 10, 1982). Hereinafter 
UNCLOS. 
21 John Hare: Shipping Law & Admiralty Jurisdiction in South Africa, 1999. p. 134. 
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in which it is registered. Nonetheless, the linkage requirement has been widely ac-
cepted as being met by nothing more than a commercial, fee-for-service relationship 
between the owner and the flag State.22 As a result, this loosened interpretation gave 
rise to the establishment of so-called “Open Registers”, where the nationality of the 
owners has no relevance. For example, the Anguillan ship register advertises with 
the note that two key features of the register are the non disclosure of beneficial 
owners and the availability of bearer shares, which greatly assist owners to ensure 
anonymity.23 Nevertheless, some key information on ownership is required every-
where, of course, when application is made. However, numerous corporate instru-
ments and structures that are freely available in many jurisdictions and accepted by 
the registers still enable reclusive owner to remain anonymous. The most common 
and effective mechanisms that can provide anonymity for beneficial owners include 
the already mentioned bearer shares, nominee shareholders, nominee Directors, the 
use of Intermediaries to act on owner’s behalf and the failure of jurisdictions to pro-
vide for effective reporting requirements.24 Consequently, the loosened linkage in 
some Registers and the corporate mechanisms freely available internationally 
(though intended to facilitate international commerce) create an effective cloak to en-
sure the anonymity of beneficial owners and have been adopted by owners as a 
common way of organising shipping enterprises. 
                        
C. Responsibility to Prevent 
Having identified the security problems and their various origins, the question 
arises, whether there is a state responsibility for prevention in international law. It is in 
many respects beyond the capacity and capability of a single state to deal with mari-
time terrorism effectively. An efficient and provident system requires a comprehen-
sive multilateral approach, bundling the collective efforts of states, international bod-
ies and private sectors.25 Omissions in this respect could even raise liability 
questions. The International Law Commission’s Draft Articles on Responsibility for In-
                                            
22 OECD. Directorate of Science, Technology and Industry: Ownership and Control of Ships. March 
2003. p. 7. 
23 Ibid p. 7. 
24 Ibid p. 1, 8. 
25 Stephen E. Flynn: Beyond Border Control. Foreign Affairs Nov./Dec. 2000. p. 58. 
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ternational Wrongful Acts stipulate that an omission by a State attracts liability under 
international law by maintaining that “[t]here is an internationally wrongful act of a 
State when conduct consisting of an action or omission: (a) Is attributable to the State 
under the international law; and (b) Constitutes a breach of an international obligation 
of the State.”26   
Already in 1934, an international legal obligation was recognized by the 
League of Nations. In response of the assassination of King Alexander of Yugosla-
via,27 a resolution was passed that stated that it was “…the duty of every state nei-
ther to encourage nor tolerate on its own territory any terrorist activity…”28 Further-
more “…every State must do all in its power to prevent and repress acts of this 
nature and must for this purpose lend its assistance to governments which request 
it.”29  
As clearly and more recently, the U.N. General Assembly and the Security 
Council have consistently emphasized that there is a positive duty to prevent terror-
ism. For example, in Resolution 1373 affirmed that each state has a duty to 
“[c]ooperate, particularly through bilateral and multilateral arrangements and agree-
ments, to prevent and suppress terrorist attacks, and take actions against perpetra-
tors of such acts.”30 General Assembly Resolutions have called on States “…to take 
appropriate practical measures to ensure that their respective territories are not used 
for terrorist installations or training camps, or for the preparation or organization of 
acts intended to be committed against other States or their citizens.”31  
Furthermore, several cases point to the fact that states owe a duty to ensure 
the safety of foreign nationals and property. The Corfu Channel case32 deals with a 
claim by the United Kingdom against Albania for damage done to a British warship by 
                                            
26 See Report of the International Law Commission, U.N. GOAR, 56th session, Supp. No 10 at 43, U.N. 
Doc. A/56/10, 2001. 
27 October 9, 1934. The assassin was a Macedonian revolutionary with links to Croatian terrorists in 
Hungary. The assassination threatened war between Yugoslavia and Hungary. See John Flournoy 
Alexander: Hungary – The Unwilling Satellite, 1947.  
28 See 12 League of Nations Official Journal 1759, 1934. 
29 Ibid. 
30 U.N. Security Council Resolution 1373, 4385th Session, U.N. Doc. S/Res/1373 (2001).  
31 Measures to Eliminate International Terrorism, General Assembly Resolution 210, U.N. GAOR 51st 
Session, § I(3), U.N. Doc. A/Res/51/210, 1997.  
32 Corfu Channel Case (U.K. v. Albania), 1949 International Court of Justice 4.  
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mines within Albania’s territorial sea. The International Court of Justice stated that the 
obligations to notify and warn approaching ships “…are based on certain general and 
well recognised principles namely, even more exacting in peace than in war; the prin-
ciple of freedom of maritime communication; and every State’s obligation not to allow 
its territory to be used for acts contrary to the rights of other states.”33 Taking up this 
reasoning, it could be suggested that states with major ports have in addition to the 
obligation to maintain security at the port facilities itself also to take reasonable steps 
to ensure the security of the contents of containers that are loaded onboard departing 
vessels.  
An older case is the Alabama Claims arbitration with another significant rul-
ing.34 During the U.S. Civil War, British authorities made only perfunctory and ineffec-
tive attempts to arrest the Alabama and Florida (both Confederate ships supporting 
the southern Confederate movement during the American Civil War) although in-
formed by the United States. The Alabama escaped and successfully sunk a signifi-
cant number of Union ships, causing the United States to seek reparations through 
arbitration at the wars end.35 The arbitrators found in favour of the United States and 
held that British Government had “…failed to use due diligence in the performance of 
its neutral obligations…” pursuant to international law. The arbitration stands for the 
proposition that “…once a government has notice, either from its own observations or 
from the complaints it receives from other states, that its territory is being used for the 
preparation of hostile acts, perfunctory efforts to stop these activities will not be suffi-
cient to meet its duty under international law.”36  
However, such a duty can naturally only extend as far as a state’s mean prac-
tically allow. That becomes clear in respect to the seemingly infinite number of con-
tainers carried around in international shipping.  Furthermore, there cannot be an 
absolute duty. The Alabama case could serve as a starting point for state 
responsibility. The duty must be defined by the exercise of due diligence.37 
Therefore, limitations may be dictated by things such as the inability to prevent the 
attack because of an absence of manpower in areas of geographical remoteness or 
                                            
33 Ibid p. 51. 
34 See Eric C. Bruggink, The “Alabama” Claims, 57 Ala. Law. 1996, p. 342. 
35 Ibid p. 343. 
36 Richard B. Lillich & John M. Paxman: State Responsibility for Injuries to Aliens Occasioned by Ter-
rorist Activities, 26 Am. U.L.Rev. 1977. p. 256-257. 
37 Ibid p. 258. 
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absence of manpower in areas of geographical remoteness or by a lack of informa-
tion.38 Consequently, where inspections are extremely difficult and costly, these limi-
tations on state responsibility seem to create a wide exemption. In this respect, an 
establishment of uniform international rules for maritime security would be a possible 
solution. However, attempts on international levels often lead to compromises and 
scattered provisions.       
           
D. Existing Law 
Over the centuries, many attempts have been made to improve security in 
shipping. The measures originate in different approaches regarding the ports, the 
vessels, the seafarers and the cargo. New developments have always required 
changes in the international regime. However, arriving at practical solutions that do 
not impede the flow of goods and restrict international economic growth was and still 
is extremely difficult. In addition to the practical problems, there are legal difficulties 
resulting from the inadequacy of existing international instruments. Over the years 
regional and international conventions were enacted that try to suppress or prevent 
security threats at sea. Nonetheless, these instruments are largely insufficient with 
respect to prevention of terrorism, because they have either attempted to fit terrorism 
within the scope of piracy or they have focused on the exertion of jurisdiction once an 
attack has occurred.  
I. 1958 Geneva Convention and UNCLOS 
Maritime terrorism as a newer security threat does not fall comfortably within 
the legal meaning of piracy in the 1958 Geneva Convention39 and UNCLOS. Both 
conventions establish four basic criteria for an act to be considered as piracy. These 
include an illegal act of violence, detention or depredation committed by the crew or 
passengers for private ends committed on the High Seas against another vessel.40 
                                            
38 See Justin S.C. Mellor, Missing the Boat: The Legal and Practical Problems of the Prevention of 
Maritime Terrorism. American University International Law Review Vol.18, p. 374. 
39 Convention on the High Seas (Geneva, April 29, 1958). Hereinafter 1958 Geneva Convention. 
40 See Art. 101 of UNCLOS which states the same as Art. 15 of the 1958 Geneva Convention:  
Piracy consists of any of the following acts:  
(a) any illegal acts of violence or detention, or any act of depredation, committed for private ends by 
the crew or the passengers of a private ship or a private aircraft, and directed: (i) on the high seas, 
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The requirements that an offence involve two vessels and that an act must be for pri-
vate ends would exclude a large number of modern terrorist acts.  
There is some argument about the “two ship requirement”. Samuel Menefee 
interprets Art. 101 UNCLOS and Art. 15 1958 Geneva Convention in the way that 
there is in fact no mention of another ship regarding sections (a)(ii)41. In his opinion, 
the High Seas would unarguably be “outside the jurisdiction of any State” as required 
in that sections42. However, this text was adopted by the definition of piracy from the 
report of the International Law Commission on the U.N. Assembly.43 The Commis-
sion specifically excluded acts committed on board a vessel by the crew or passen-
gers and directed against the vessel itself, or against persons or property on that 
vessel.44 Though Menefee’s argument is based closely to the text we cannot ignore 
the intention of the legislation. Otherwise we would force the law to fit the changed 
reality. 
The “private ends” issue is also a source of considerable debate. It would ex-
clude acts committed out of some political motivation. Sometimes it seems not clear, 
whether an act has private ends. An act may also have both private and political 
ends. Additionally, though a perpetrator may deem an act to be political, it not neces-
sarily is so.45 Therefore, this requirement appears vague. As a consequence, a Pal-
istinian terrorist seizure of the Achille Lauro was characterized as a form of piracy by 
the United States, although the motivation could easily have categorized as a political 
                                                                                                                                        
against another ship or aircraft, or against persons or property on board such ship or aircraft; (ii) a-
gainst a ship, aircraft, persons or property in a place outside the jurisdiction of any State;  
(b) any act of voluntary participation in the operation of a ship or of an aircraft with knowledge of 
facts making it a pirate ship or aircraft;  
(c) any act of inciting or of intentionally facilitating an act described in subparagraph (a) or (b).  
41 See supra note 9. 
42 Samuel P. Menefee: Anti-Piracy law in the Year of the Ocean. ILSA J. Int’l & Comp. L. 1999, p. 309, 
312.    
43 Report of the International Law Commission: Regime of the High Seas and the Territorial Sea. 2 
Y.B. International Law Commission 1955, p. 20. 
44 Ibid at p. 65. 
45 Samuel P. Menefee: The New Jamaica Discipline: Problems with Piracy, Maritime Terrorism and the 
1982 Convention on the Law of the Sea, 6 CONN. J. Int’l L. 1990, p. 141, 143. 
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one.46 However, the International Law Commission once again took a narrow view of 
the definition of piracy, excluding every political connection.47  
Finally, there is little in either Convention that would assist in preventing secu-
rity threats. The 1958 Geneva Convention and UNCLOS state a “right of visit” for a 
foreign warship which encounter on the high seas a foreign ship, if there is reason-
able ground for suspecting that the ship is engaged in piracy.48 That means that 
countries are allowed to conduct searches of suspect vessels at sea before they en-
ter the territorial waters. However, the requirement of “reasonable grounds” is not 
really able to establish a comprehensive maritime security regime and would espe-
cially rule out random inspections. Furthermore, Art. 110(3) UNCLOS and Art. 22 (3) 
1958 Geneva Convention provide that if the suspicions prove to be unfounded, and 
provided that the ship boarded has not committed any act justifying them, the owner 
of the vessel shall be compensated for any loss or damage that may have been sus-
tained. As a result, a wrongful inspection would be a very costly procedure and con-
sequently an inappropriate measure of prevention.  
The only reference that could indicate a multilateral approach is given in Art. 
100 UNCLOS and Art. 14 1958 Geneva Convention. It obligates States to cooperate 
to the fullest possible extend in the repression of piracy on the high seas or any other 
place outside the jurisdiction of any State. However, it seems impossible - against the 
background of Art. 110 (3) UNCLOS with its compensation system - to facilitate any 
effective preventive measures. Furthermore, the provision does not account for the 
fact that an unlawful act may involve multiple perpetrators, both on the high seas and 
within various national jurisdictions.49     
                                            
46 Documents Concerning the Achille Lauro Affair and Cooperation in Combating International Terror-
ism, 24 I.L.M. 1985, p. 1509, 1554. The U.S. Department obtained warrants for the arrest of the 
Achille Lauro terrorists for “piracy on the high seas”.   
47 Stating: “Although States at times have claimed the right to treat as pirates unrecognized insurgents 
against a foreign government who have pretended to exercise belligerent rights on the sea against 
neutral commerce, … and although there is authority for subjecting some case of these types to the 
common jurisdiction of all States, it seems best, to confine the common jurisdiction to offenders act-
ing for private ends only.” See Summary Records of the 290th Meeting. 1 Y.B.Intenational Law Com-
mission 1955, p. 37, 41. 
48 See Art. 110(1) UNCLOS and Art. 22(1) 1958 Geneva Convention. 
49 Justin S.C. Mellor, Missing the Boat: The Legal and Practical Problems of the Prevention of Mari-
time Terrorism. American University International Law Review Vol.18, p. 381. 
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Both the 1958 Geneva Convention and the UNCLOS are not able to deal with 
a modern definition of security in shipping. They approach the topic in a manner that 
evokes historical conception of piracy. This serves merely to obfuscate the present 
threat50, but cannot contribute to a comprehensive security system.   
II. SUA Convention 
In response to the hijacking of the Achille Lauro51 cruise ship and the lack of 
the existing international law in several key aspects, the governments of Egypt, Aus-
tria and Italy proposed the creation of a new convention on the subject of unlawful 
acts against safety of maritime navigation in November 1986.52 As a result, in March 
1988, a conference in Rome adopted the SUA Convention.53 This new Convention 
represented an improvement over the existing rules in the sense that it moved away 
from the aforementioned problems associated with piracy, such as “private ends” and 
“two ship requirement”. The main purpose of the SUA Convention is to ensure that 
appropriate action is taken against persons committing unlawful acts against ships, 
which include the seizure of ships by force, acts of violence against persons on board 
ships, and the placing of devices on board a ship which are likely to destroy or dam-
age it (Art. 3(1) SUA). Furthermore, the treaties oblige Contracting Governments ei-
ther to extradite or prosecute alleged offenders (Art. 10 SUA). The Convention consti-
tuted a response to the shrinking universal jurisdiction brought about by UNCLOS.  
However, its outcome is more reactive than preventive, in nature. There are 
only a few provisions aimed at prevention. Art. 13 SUA establishes a general duty of 
                                            
50 Samuel P. Menefee: Anti-Piracy law in the Year of the Ocean. ILSA J. Int’l & Comp. L. 1999, p. 309, 
315.   
51 On October 7, 1985, a group of Palestinians seized the Achille Lauro, an Italian registered cruise 
ship, in Egypt’s territorial waters, and asked for the release of Palestinian prisoners from Israeli jails. 
In response to Israel’s refusal, the terrorists murdered an elderly Jewish U.S. citizen. Egypt negoti-
ated the release of the hostages and took the terrorists into custody, but did not actually arrest them. 
Subsequently, the hijackers boarded an Egypt flight to Tunisia. Under U.S. pressure, Tunisia did not 
allow the aircraft to land. The aircraft was forced down at a NATO airfield in Italy where a standoff 
occurred between U.S. and Italian authorities over which government had jurisdiction. The Italian 
Government denied the U.S. request for extradition and tried the hijackers in Italy.    
52 IMO: Enhancing maritime security, p. 2. See at 
http://www.imo.org/Newsroom/mainframe.asp?topic_id=582. 
53 IMO Convention on the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against Safety of Maritime Navigation, 1988. 
(SUA)   
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states to prevent the use of their territories as bases for possible attacks and requires 
states to exchange information. Art. 14 SUA defines the information requirements 
and pose several problems. First, it restricts the flow of information to only those 
states that may exert jurisdiction in accordance with the SUA, although any act in-
volving maritime shipping would likely have implications for a multitude of third party 
states. Furthermore, the passing of information must follow the national law of the 
state possessing the information. Most states have some form of official secret acts, 
criminalizing the passing of information to a foreign power, except where it is explic-
itly approved.54 That would lead to impediments and information would not always be 
timely and forthcoming. Finally, a state is only required to transmit when it has “rea-
son to believe that an offence set force in Art. 3 will be committed”.55 Consequently, 
the transmission is not aimed at a regular course.    
The Convention largely relegates the prevention issue to the preamble. It calls 
the IMO to develop measures “to prevent unlawful acts which threaten the safety of 
ships” and it affirms “the desirability of monitoring rules and standards relating to the 
prevention and control of unlawful acts against ships and persons on board ships, 
with the view to updating them as necessary.”56 However, in the years after the en-
actment of that convention, the IMO did not take significant action relating to ship se-
curity, but focused more on its traditional role of preventing maritime pollution and 
promoting safety at sea. 
Accordingly, there remain many gaps in an effective prevention mechanism. 
Though the Convention represents a commitment to the prevention of unlawful acts, 
it is ultimately up to the signatory states themselves to make the treaty work.57 Since 
the Convention was concluded by the parties, states have accomplished very little in 
this area. However, they have suggested the need for a multilateral mechanism 
aimed squarely at prevention.58 
                                            
54 Justin S.C. Mellor, Missing the Boat: The Legal and Practical Problems of the Prevention of Mari-
time Terrorism. American University International Law Review Vol.18, p. 386. 
55 Art. 14 SUA. 
56 Preamble SUA. 
57 Phillip E. Fried: International Agreements – Convention and Protocol from the International Confer-
ence on the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Maritime Navigation. 30 Harvard In-
ternational Law Journal 1989. p. 226, 227.  
58 Justin S.C. Mellor, Missing the Boat: The Legal and Practical Problems of the Prevention of Mari-
time Terrorism. American University International Law Review Vol.18, p. 386. 
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III. Conventions on Seafarers 
Another area that requires collective effort and close cooperation is the secu-
rity documentation and verification of seafarers. For as long as mariners have gone 
to sea on merchant vessels, the shore leave has been a cherished right. The Interna-
tional Maritime Organization’s Convention on Facilitation of International Maritime 
Traffic59 contains a codification of that right.60 For that reason, the International La-
bour Organisation (ILO) further specified in its Seafarers’ Identity Documents Con-
vention61 that the only documentation that a seafarer needs is a valid seafarers’ iden-
tity document62, which is to be issued by the states to their nationals or permanently 
resident seafarers. However, forms of background checks prior to being permitted to 
work internationally with such a certificate are barely carried out. As a consequence, 
United States is the only maritime nation that requires foreign merchant vessel crews 
to have a visa in order to apply for shore leave63, and they thus curtail a long existing 
customary right in maritime law. In that connection, it has to be considered that visas 
are difficult to arrange, if ships change destination. On the other hand, in a study car-
ried out by the Seafarers International Research Centre covering 97 maritime ad-
ministrations in 2001, a total of over 12.000 cases of fraudulent certificates of compe-
tency were detected.64 This statistic serves to illustrate the unreliable state of the art 
for the present identification system.                
                                            
59 Convention on Facilitation of International Maritime Traffic, April 9, 1965.  
60 Ibid § 3.19.1: “Foreign crew members shall be allowed ashore by the public authorities while the 
ship…is in the port, provided that the formalities on arrival of the ship have been fulfilled and the 
public authorities have no reason to refuse permission to come ashore for reasons of public health, 
public safety, or public order.”  
61 Seafarers’ Identity Documents Convention, 1958, (No 108).  
62 Ibid Art. 6.1. 
63 Douglas B. Stevenson: The Burden that 9/11 Imposed on Seafarers, 77 Tulane Law Review 2003, 
p. 1408. 
64 Arne Sagen: Practical Issues raised by the ISPS Code. Lloyd’s List International. August, 2003. 
http://www.lexis-nexis.com/professional/.  
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IV. ISM Code      
The ISM Code65 aims to ensure safety at sea, prevention of human injury or 
loss of life and avoidance of damage to the environment in promoting new standards. 
Consequently, security issues are not directly dealt with. However, the ISM Code ap-
pears to be interesting in one aspect: It requires the operators to designate a person 
or persons ashore having direct access to the highest levels of management of the 
shipowning company. This provision addresses the responsibilities of the people who 
manage and operate the ships, and tries to achieve identifiability and accountability 
of the shipowner in lifting the veil of ship operating companies. That could prevent the 
possibility of beneficial shipowners to cover their identity. Certainly, the requirement 
of a designated person with access to the highest levels of management will make it 
more difficult for a perpetrator to hide behind the veil of anonymity. However, the 
Prestige accident66 has shown that the chain of responsibility is not yet transparent 
enough. Month after the disaster the identity of the beneficial owner or operator, and 
consequently the party ultimately responsible for the ship, was still unclear. That 
could lead some to follow the “…convoluted chain of ownership and responsibil-
ity…what has been described as a ‘morass of liability’.”67  Similarly, it could lead oth-
ers to take advantage for criminal purposes. Consequently, the ISM Code apparently 
still reveals too many gaps for both safety and security issues. 
  
E. New Measures 
Not surprisingly, after the September 11th attacks in New York, several meas-
ures were discussed on both a national and an international basis to reduce inade-
quacies and to upgrade the security of shipping in existing international law. As it has 
become clear, the problem is complex and involves a wide range of parties such as 
                                            
65 The International Safety Managment Code for the Safe Operation of Ships and for Pollution Preven-
tion. Adopted by the IMO by incorporation into Chapter IX of the SOLAS Convention. Assembly 
Resolution A.742(18).  
66 On Wednesday 13 November 2002, the Prestige, a Bahamas-registered, 26-year-old single-hull 
tanker owned by a Liberian company and carrying 77 000 tonnes of heavy fuel oil, sprang a leak off 
the coast of Galicia. It eventually broke apart on 19 November and sank 270 km off the Spanish 
coast. 
67 Jaworski: Development in Vessel-Based Pollution. Prestige oil catastrophe threatens West Euro-
pean Coastline. CJIEL&P 2002, 101.  
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port, flag, and coastal state along with shippers and manufacturers. The complexity 
of the problem dictates that any new approach would require international coopera-
tion. However, there is a good chance that the attempt to develop a comprehensive 
system will finally lead to diverse regional and international approaches and regula-
tions. Naturally, if various international, national, regional and local agencies are 
working on solutions, a myriad of initiatives will be enacted. These are based on dif-
ferent criteria and standards. That makes it even more difficult to establish a unified 
system.  
The most important new approaches will be analysed in the following.       
I. Port and Ship Security 
An international security regime pertaining to ports and vessels entered into 
force in July 2004. It was adopted by the International Maritime Organization (IMO) in 
December 2002. Historically, the IMO has principally focused on maritime safety and 
the prevention of maritime pollution by ships68, as opposed to security matters. In this 
respect, the IMO was alleged not to deal with the matter comprehensively. A new se-
curity regime may involve not just existing national maritime authorities, but also se-
curity and custom organizations. In this sense, a new regime would extend beyond 
simply focusing on the maritime aspects.69 However, in the wake of the attacks on 
September 11, 2001, the IMO Assembly “…agreed to hold a Conference on Maritime 
Security…to adopt new regulations to enhance ship and port security and thus re-
duce the possibility of shipping becoming a target of international terrorism.”70 The 
Conference was attended by 108 Contracting Governments to the 1974 SOLAS71 
Convention.72 It was stated during the opening: 
                                            
68 See Art. 1(a) of the IMO Convention. International Maritime Organization: Introduction to IMO. See 
at http://www.imo.org/About/mainframe.asp?topic_id=3. . 
69 Justin S.C. Mellor, Missing the Boat: The Legal and Practical Problems of the Prevention of Mari-
time Terrorism. American University International Law Review Vol.18, p. 391. 
70 International Maritime Organization: IMO adopts comprehensive maritime security measures. Press 
Release, Dec 2002. http://www.imo.org/Newsroom/mainframe.asp?topic_id=583&doc_id=2689.  
71 International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea. 1914 with subsequent versions in 1929, 1948, 
1960 and 1974. SOLAS has been accepted by 146 Parties representing 98.6% of world tonnage. 
72 International Maritime Organization: IMO adopts comprehensive maritime security measures. Press 
Release, Dec 2002. http://www.imo.org/Newsroom/mainframe.asp?topic_id=583&doc_id=2689.  
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“The presence here today of so many distinguished Government representa-
tives and international organization observers from all over the world demon-
strates the crucial significance and importance of the Conference not only to 
the international maritime community but to the world community as a whole 
given the pivotal role shipping plays in the conduct of world trade.”73    
The Conference adopted a number of amendments to the 1974 SOLAS Con-
vention that present a new, comprehensive security regime for international shipping. 
The centrepiece and most far-reaching of which enshrines the ISPS Code.74  
1. ISPS Code 
In essence, the ISPS Code takes the approach that ensuring the security of 
ships and port facilities is basically a risk management activity and that to determine 
what security measures are appropriate, an assessment of the risks must be made in 
each particular case. It is to provide a standardized, consistent framework for evalu-
ating risk, enabling governments to offset changes in threat with changes in vulner-
ability for ships and port facilities.75 The Code contains detailed security-related re-
quirements for governments, port authorities and shipping companies in Part A, 
which is mandatory, in addition to a series of guidelines about how to meet these re-
quirements in Part B, which is non-mandatory.76 
a) Application 
The provisions of the Code apply to ships engaged on international voyages 
and consequently to port facilities serving such ships.77 It does not, however, apply to 
the whole port area, but only serves the ship/port interface. Measures for the remain-
ing area were left to a joint work between the IMO and the ILO. The Code applies to 
passenger ships, cargo ships of 500 gross tonnage and upwards and mobile offshore 
                                            
73 International Maritime Organization: Historic Maritime Security Conference to Adopt Comprehensive 
New Security Measures for International Shipping. Press Release Dec 2002, see at 
http://www.imo.org/Newsroom/mainframe.asp?topic_id=583&doc_id=2684.  
74 International Ship and Port Facility Security Code (ISPS), Chapter XI-2 of SOLAS. 
75 International Maritime Organization: Enhancing Maritime Security. Press Release. 
http://www.imo.org/Newsroom/mainframe.asp?topic_id=582.  
76 Ibid. 
77 Sec 3.1.1/ 3.1.2 ISPS Code. 
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drillings.78 The Governments can, however, decide the extent of application to such 
ports which are used primarily for national trade and only occasionally are involved in 
international shipping.79 That gives on one hand a certain scope to states in order to 
maintain an undisturbed, seamless flow of goods within the country (noting that port 
regulation and security traditionally have been matters for state and local authorities), 
and on the other hand serves the international aim of these provisions. However, it 
could be used as a gap in the system if a state considers a port as not enough “inter-
national”. Other ports would in that case have to categorize ships arriving from such 
ports into higher risk levels.  
b) Responsibility of Contracting Governments 
To begin the whole security process, each contracting government will con-
duct port facility assessments. For such security assessments different factors have 
to be considered: 
• the degree that the threat information is credible; 
• the degree the information is corroborated; 
• the degree that the threat information is specific or imminent; and 
• the potential consequences of such a security incident.80 
They must therefore identify and evaluate important assets and infrastructures 
that are critical to the port facility as well as those areas or structures that if damaged, 
could cause significant loss of life or damage to the port facility’s economy or envi-
ronment. Furthermore, the actual threats must be identified in order to prioritise secu-
rity measures. Finally, the assessment must address vulnerability of the port facility 
by identifying its weakness in physical security, structural integrity, protection sys-
tems, procedural policies, communication systems, transportation infrastructure, utili-
ties, and other areas within a port that may be a likely target.81 Once these assess-
ments have been completed, contracting governments can accurately evaluate risk. 
The next step is to set an appropriate security level in order to communicate 
the threat at a port facility or for a ship. Security levels 1, 2, and 3 correspond to nor-
                                            
78 Ibid. 
79 Sec 3.2 ISPS Code. 
80 Sec 4.1.1-4 ISPS Code. 
81 International Maritime Organization: IMO adopts comprehensive maritime security measures. Press 
Release, Dec 2002. http://www.imo.org/Newsroom/mainframe.asp?topic_id=583&doc_id=2689. 
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mal, medium and high threat situation, respectively.82 The security level creates the 
link between the ship and the port facility, since it triggers the implementation of ap-
propriate security measures for both. 
Moreover, the governments have various responsibilities according to the 
Code, including the approval to the Ship Security Plans83 and relevant amendments 
to a previously approved plan, verification of the compliance of ships with the provi-
sions of SOLAS chapter XI-2 and part A of the ISPS Code (sec 19.1.2 ISPS Code), 
issuing the International Ship Security Certificate (sec 19.2.2 ISPS Code), ensuring 
the completion and approval of the Port Facility Plans84 and any subsequent 
amendments (sec 16.2 ISPS Code), and exercising control and compliance meas-
ures. They are also responsible for communicating information to the International 
Maritime Organization and to the shipping and port industries.85 For all these pur-
poses, governments can designate, or establish, Designated Authorities to undertake 
their security duties and allow Recognized Security Organizations to carry out certain 
work with respect to port facilities. That bears the risk of getting too much distance to 
official governmental work. However, the final decision on the acceptance and ap-
proval of this work should still be given by the government or authority.86        
c) Ship Security 
Shipping companies will be required to designate a Company Security Officer 
for the company (sec 11.1 ISPS Code) and a Ship Security Officer for each of its 
ships (sec 12.1 ISPS Code). The Company Security Officer’s87 duties and responsi-
bilities include that a special Ship Security Assessment is properly carried out, that 
subsequently appropriate Ship Security Plans are prepared and submitted for ap-
                                            
82 See definitions in sec 2.1.9-11 ISPS Code.  
83 See in E.I.1.c). 
84 See in E.I.1.d). 
85 See sec 9 of the Preamble ISPS Code.  
86 International Maritime Organization: IMO adopts comprehensive maritime security measures. Press 
Release, Dec 2002. http://www.imo.org/Newsroom/mainframe.asp?topic_id=583&doc_id=2689. 
87 The Company Security Officer is roughly analogous to the ‘designated’ person under the abovemen-
tioned ISM Code, and many companies are combining these shore-based functions. See Interna-
tional Chamber of Shipping ICF: Delivering Maritime Security, Key Issues 2004. 
http://www.marisec.org/ics-isfkeyissues2004/maritimesecuritytext.htm.   
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proval by (or on behalf of) the administration, that security awareness and vigilance 
are enhanced, and that the personnel is adequately trained.88  
The abovementioned assessment resembles the assessment for the port fa-
cilities. The diverse weak links concerning the ship’s security including human factors 
have to be considered. It is the foundation of the following Ship Security Plan that in-
dicates the operational and physical security measures the ship itself should take to 
ensure it always operates at security level 1. That means under the terms of the 
Code that access to the ship is controlled, deck areas and areas around the ship are 
monitored, the handling of cargo and ship’s stores is supervised, and the communi-
cation is readily available.89 Furthermore, the Plan should also show the additional, 
intensified security measures the ship itself can take to move to and operate at secu-
rity level 2 and 3 when instructed to do so.  
The Ship Security Officer is responsible for inspecting, maintaining, supervis-
ing and coordinating all security related aspects on board the ship.90 The Code could 
be interpreted as if the master of the ship is prevented from being the designated 
Ship Security Officer defining his special responsibilities, training etc. next to the 
master.91 However, that interpretation was not aimed92 and cannot be in the sense of 
an effective system. It has to be viewed in conjunction with chapter XI-2/8 SOLAS on 
“Master’s discretion for ship safety and security”, which makes it clear that the master 
has ultimate responsibility for safety and security, and could naturally also perform 
his duty as a Ship Security Officer. It is, however, for the national administration to 
decide if they wish to impose particular restrictions on who may serve as that special 
person on ships flying their flag. 
The ships will have to carry an International Ship Security Certificate indicating 
that they comply with the security requirements. It will be issued by the flag state and 
lasts for five years. It can, however, cease to be valid, if a company assumes the re-
                                            
88 Sec 11.2 ISPS Code. 
89 Sec 7.2 and sec 9.4 ISPS Code. 
90 Sec 12.2 ISPS Code. 
91 See especially sec 2.1.6 ISPS Code that defines him as “…the person on board the ship, account-
able to the master…” or the enumeration in sec 6.2 ISPS Code “…the master and the ship security 
officer…” 
92 See International Maritime Organization: ISPS Code and Maritime Security. 
http://www.imo.org/Newsroom/mainframe.asp?topic_id=897. 
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sponsibility for the operation of a ship not previously operated by that company, and 
upon transfer of the ship to a flag of another state.93 
When a ship is in a port or is proceeding to a port, the port’s contracting gov-
ernment has the right, under the provisions of chapter XI-2/9 SOLAS to exercise 
various control and compliance measures with respect to that ship. Therefore, the 
ship can be subject to port State control inspections. However, such inspections will 
normally not extend to examination of the Ship Security Plan itself expect in specific 
circumstances.94 The ship may, also, be subject to additional control measures if a 
contracting government exercising the control and compliance measures has reason 
to believe that the security of the ship has, or the port facilities it has served have, 
been compromised.95  
d) Port Facility 
As it was explained, each contracting government has to ensure completion of 
a Port Facility Security Assessment for each port facility within its territory that serves 
ships engaged on international voyages pursuant to sec 15.2 ISPS Code. This as-
sessment is fundamentally a risk analysis following the criteria of sec 15.5 ISPS 
Code of all aspects of a port facility operation in order to determine which parts of it 
are more susceptible, or more likely, to be the subject of an attack. The security risk 
is evaluated in respect of a mutual connection of the threats coupled with the vulner-
ability of the target and the consequences of an attack. On completion of the analy-
sis, it will be possible to produce an overall assessment of the level of the risk. It will 
help to determine which port facilities are required to appoint a Port Facility Security 
Officer (sec 17.1 ISPS Code). Furthermore, the Port Facility Security Plan can be 
prepared out of this analysis. The plan should indicate – like a security plan on a ship 
– the measures the port facility should take to ensure that it always operates in the 
appropriate security levels. However, the Code was not intended to impede the inter-
national trade. Therefore sec 14.1 ISPS Code clearly emphasises that security 
measures and procedures shall be applied at the port facilities in such a manner as 
                                            
93 Richards Butler: International Code for the Security of Ships and of Port Facilities – The ISPS Code, 
January 2004. See at http://www.richardsbutler.com/pdf/the_isps_code.pdf. 
94 International Maritime Organization: IMO adopts comprehensive maritime security measures. Press 
Release, Dec 2002. http://www.imo.org/Newsroom/mainframe.asp?topic_id=583&doc_id=2689. 
95 Ibid. 
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to cause minimum of interference with, or delay to, passengers, ships, ship’s person-
nel and visitors, goods and services. 
e) Enforcement 
The system of the ISPS Code only works, if both ports and ships comply with 
the security procedures in order to adjust their security levels. If a ship does not com-
ply with those requirements, it should not be issued with the International Ship Secu-
rity Certificate. As a consequence, contracting governments should direct those ships 
flying their flag to immediately discontinue operations until they have been issued 
with the required certificate.96 The ISPS Code does not provide a law enforcement 
provision for states. That will be left to domestic law. However, port state control will 
also drive compliance. Ships are subject to controls when in a port of other contract-
ing governments. If a vessel does not have a valid certificate, that ship may be de-
tained in port until it gets a certificate. Of course, the port State has various other op-
tions available at its disposal, if there is no certificate. Regulation 9 of the new 
SOLAS Chapter XI-2 (Chapter XI-2/9) provides port states with the power to impose 
a range of control measures on foreign ships should they fail to prove their compli-
ance with the maritime security regime or choose not to provide information that may 
be requested. The authorities may curtail the operations of the ship, they may expel 
the ship from the port or they may refuse entry of the ship. Accordingly, the measures 
which are in place have been designed in such a way to ensure that those ships 
which do not have certificates find themselves out of the market in the shortest pos-
sible time. In addition, ships which call at port facilities that have failed to comply with 
the ISPS Code, although they may hold a valid Ship Security Certificate, may be 
faced with additional security requirements at subsequent ports of call, leading to de-
lays and possible denial of port entry.97 That could lead owners and charterers to the 
decision to instruct their ships not to proceed to port facilities which have not com-
plied with the requirements of the ISPS Code, primarily, because of the problems 
such ships may encounter at subsequent ports of call. 
                                            
96 See International Maritime Organization: ISPS Code and Maritime Security. 
http://www.imo.org/Newsroom/mainframe.asp?topic_id=897. 
97 Richards Butler: International Code for the Security of Ships and of Port Facilities – The ISPS Code, 
January 2004. See at http://www.richardsbutler.com/pdf/the_isps_code.pdf. 
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f) Opposing International Law? 
The described new security regime has to be reviewed under existing interna-
tional law. The provided measures that include blacklists and bans of ships could 
raise important issues concerning flag discrimination and the legal right of states to 
close their ports to foreign vessels. There could be a right of entry into foreign ports in 
respect of international law.  
The Convention on the International Regime of Maritime Ports of 192398 (and 
the Statute99 annexed to it) stated a reciprocal freedom of access and equality of 
treatment of ships in the ports of the states’ parties. However, as it is said in the pre-
amble, the Convention intended to secure “…freedom of communications…by guar-
anteeing in the maritime ports under [the] sovereignty or authority [of the Parties] and 
the purposes of international trade equality of treatment between the ships of all the 
Contracting States, their cargo and passengers.” The Convention accordingly did not 
regulate the right of entry, but rather its conditions. Furthermore, the convention has 
only received limited ratification.100 Thus, it could not codify an existing right of entry 
or generate a right which later passed into customary law. 
The Aramco arbitration of 1958101, in particular, presents an interesting view 
on this subject. It was herein stated that “[a]ccording to a great principle of public in-
ternational law, the ports of every State must be open to foreign merchant vessels 
and can only be closed when the vital interests of a State so require.”102 However, in 
respect to the arbitration, it can certainly be argued that the “vital interests” of a State” 
would comprise the need to keep its territory free of the threat of terrorist attack.  
The right to close one’s ports to foreign vessels is a naturally corollary to the 
principle of state sovereignty. As one commentator has observed, “…limitations to 
sovereignty cannot be presumed and there is no evidence of any limitations in state 
practise in relation to sovereignty over ports.”103 The judgement of the International 
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Court of Justice in 1986 in the Nicaragua case104 confirms conclusion. “The basic le-
gal concept of state sovereignty in customary international law…extends to the terri-
torial waters and territorial sea of every state…It is also by virtue of its sovereignty 
that the coastal state may regulate access to its ports.”105 Consequently, there is no 
right of free access for foreign ships in international (customary) law that the new se-
curity regime could contravene. 
However, a significant impediment to the new security regime may appear in 
the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT).106 Article 5(2) provides for 
“Freedom of Transit” and states:  
“There shall be freedom of transit through the territory of each contracting 
party, via the routes most convenient for international transit, for traffic in 
transit to or from the territory of other contracting parties. No distinction 
shall be made which is based on the flag of the vessel, the place of origin, 
departure, entry, exit or destination, or on any circumstances relating to 
the ownership of goods, of vessels or of other means of transport.” 
There are security exceptions in GATT, but these appear somehow limited. Ar-
ticle 21 (c) allows any party to take action that violates the agreement if it is “…in pur-
suance of its obligation under the United Nation Charter for the maintenance of inter-
national peace and security.” This provision suggests that security concerns may in 
some cases be permitted to override other sections of the agreement. Nonetheless, a 
new security regime targeting certain vessels and cargo as a regular matter might 
constitute a violation of the agreement. If such regime has its foundation in other in-
ternational agreements (like SOLAS), it could arguably be seen as an overriding 
amendment and concordant limitation of GATT. If, however, a state decides on its 
own to generally make ships carrying containers from suspicious countries subject to 
special scrutiny by government authorities, then this would result in some form of 
trade discrimination.         
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g) Implementation 
Since the ISPS Code is a part of the 1974 SOLAS Convention, it has to be im-
plemented by all 146 contracting governments into national law. The Code came into 
effect on July 1, 2004. However, even if a contracting government does not adopt the 
rules into its own national legislation, the IMO would not be allowed to impose penal-
ties. Nevertheless it is to be anticipated that the market forces and economic factors 
will drive compliance.107 In simple terms, if a state does not comply, ship operators 
will avoid its ports in order not to get refused or not to suffer from delays in destina-
tion ports because of security reservations. The other way around, shippers will avoid 
ships without a valid certification of its flag state for the same reasons.  
That led to a significant number of implementations. According to the latest 
figures available to the IMO Secretariat from reports received by Governments, 89.5 
percent of over 9000 declared port facilities now have their Port Facility Security 
Plans approved, a figure which shows considerable improvement from the 69 percent 
reported on the 1 July 2004 entry-into-force date of the new regulatory regime.108 
Equally, the information available from industry sources on International Ship Secu-
rity Certificates issued for ships which have to comply with the new regulatory re-
gime, indicates that the compliance rate is now well beyond the 90 percent mark, 
which compares favourably with the 86 percent of approved ship security plans re-
ported on 1 July 2004.109 Despite the overall optimism over implementation, progress 
has not been as rapid as might be hoped in all regions. The statistics suggest Africa 
is falling behind other continents in complying with the new regulations, with just over 
half of the 30 countries in Africa to which the Code applies reporting approved port 
security measures. Countries in the former Soviet Union and Eastern Europe have 
also been slow to implement the measures.110  
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South Africa, however, has already implemented the maritime security re-
quirements through the Merchant Shipping (Maritime Security) Regulations, 2004.111 
They apply to South Africa's seven major ports, namely Saldanha Bay, Cape Town, 
Mossel Bay, Port Elizabeth, East London, Durban and Richards Bay. The South Afri-
can Maritime Safety Authority (SAMSA) is responsible for approving ship security 
plans for South African ships, for verifying compliance with plans, and for issuing the 
International Ship Security Certificate.112 
The European Parliament and the Council of the European Union adopted the 
obligating Regulation on Enhancing Ship and Port Facility Security113 in order to en-
sure a harmonised implementation and equal conditions throughout the European 
Union. It goes beyond the mandatory provisions of the ISPS Code in making manda-
tory certain provisions of Part B. The regulation extends all of the provisions to in-
clude passenger ships engaged on certain domestic voyages, and the provisions re-
garding security assessments, security plans, company and ship security officers to 
include on other ships engaged in domestic travel. It details and strengthens the pro-
visions for ports only occasionally serving international traffic and establishes the sys-
tem of checks prior to the entry of ships of whatever origin into a Community port, as 
well as in the port. Finally it calls for a single national authority responsible for the se-
curity of ships and port facilities.114 A survey made among ESPO members during the 
last week of June shows that all main European port facilities met the 1 July deadline 
set by the ISPS Code and the EU Regulation on Ship and Port Facility Security.115 
In the United States the ISPS Code requirements and a whole set of other 
measures were adopted by the Maritime Transportation Security Act (MTSA).116 The 
rules also apply to domestic traffic and make mandatory most of Part B of the Code. 
To ensure compliance with the ISPS Code, the Coast Guard is empowered, under its 
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port/state control authority, to board every foreign-flag vessel intending to enter a 
U.S. port in order to check its compliance.117 
2. Other SOLAS Amendments 
The ISPS Code is only one of a series of amendments to the 1974 SOLAS 
Convention to further enhance maritime security.  
The Conference renumbered existing SOLAS chapter XI, special measures to 
enhance maritime safety that have, however, also an impact on security. Regulation 
XI-1/3 states that ships require identification numbers to be permanently marked in a 
visible place either on the ship’s hull or superstructure. Regulation XI-1/5 requires 
that ships be issued with a Continuous Synopsis Record, which is intended as an on-
board record of the ship’s history, including information such as the name of the ship 
and the State whose flag it is entitled to fly, the date when it was registered, the iden-
tification number, the port where the ship is registered, and the name of each regis-
tered owner and his or her registered address.  
Other amendments in chapter XI-2 concern specifically maritime security. 
Regulation XI-2/3 requires administrations to set security levels for their ships. Prior 
to entering a port, or whilst within a port of a contracting government, a ship shall 
comply with the requirements for the security level set by the contracting government, 
if that level is higher than the one set by the administration for that ship. Regulation 
XI-2/5 requires ships to be provided with a ship security alert system, with most ves-
sels being fitted by 2004 and the remainder by 2006. When activated the system 
shall initiate and transmit a ship-to-shore security alert to a competent authority, iden-
tifying the ship, its location and indicating that the security of the ship is under threat 
or it has been compromised. It recognizes the need of a different response that to 
distress or emergency situations on board.  
3. Effects of the SOLAS Amendments 
The SOLAS Amendments and especially the ISPS Code have substantial im-
plications in many respects. It affects commercial operations, long-term fixtures, in-
surance and relations with cargo. Therefore the different types of charterparties have 
to be adapted. 
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Delays, costs and expenses may well be incurred in connection with security 
measures taken according to the ISPS Code. That could include extra security 
measures on board and ashore, extended loading and discharge, delays in getting 
contractors, surveyors and supercargo on board or additional port and flag state in-
spections and drills. Some of these costs are foreseeable, but many are not, like for 
example additional costs of moving from one security level into another. The burden 
must be borne by the owners or the charterers or shared between them. Therefore, 
the liability between the owners and the charterers for these delays, costs and ex-
penses must be allocated. When fixing ships on charters the allocation of these costs 
should be provided for. There are discussed several ways this might be done: 
• by allocating to owners those expenses which are directly related to the 
ship and to charterers those expenses which relate to the port and the 
cargo 
• by providing the vessel on the basis of ISPS Security Level 1 with char-
terers responsible for the costs of higher security levels 
• by ‘regulation change clauses’ to provide a mechanism for allocating 
any expense caused by changes of laws and regulations coming into 
effect after the fixture.118  
a)  Shipowner and Demise Charterer 
However the relation will be arranged between the owners and the charterers, 
it is to the shipowners to provide a ship that is compliant to the ISPS Code and other 
laws and regulations relating to security. That would include that the owners shall 
procure that both the vessel and the company (as defined by the ISPS Code) shall 
comply with the requirements of the ISPS Code relating to the vessel and the com-
pany. Upon request the owners shall provide a copy of the relevant International Ship 
Security Certificate to the Charterers. The same obligation meets the demise char-
terer towards his sub-charterers, since he is in many respects deemed to be the 
owner, whereby possession and control of the ship are completely passed from the 
shipowner to the demise charterer.119 This kind of compliance is the basis for the 
risks to be allocated in the charterparties. 
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b) Time Charterparties 
In a time charterparty the charterer contracts with the owner - or the demise 
charterer as ‘disponent owner’ - for the exclusive use of the cargo carrying spaces on 
board a ship for a fixed period of time.120 Thus a timecharterer does not hire the 
whole vessel itself. Nevertheless, the new security provisions pose some obligations 
to him, as well.  
Under the ISPS Code, every ship must maintain a ‘Continuous Synopsis Re-
cord’ of the vessel’s ownership and employment.121 The required information rea-
garding the charterers details is naturally not available to owners, and a lack would 
lead to non-compliance with the Code and possibly to delays. The charterers should 
therefore ensure that owners are aware of their full style contact details, and also of 
any sub-charterers, and they should further ensure, that any sub-charterparty in-
cludes terms to the same effect.122 
Once these prerequisites are given and the vessel operates in compliance 
with the Code, the question arises how expenses and costs will be allocated. The 
BIMCO Clause123 suggests that, firstly, all delays, costs or expenses arising out of 
security measures taken by the port facilities or other relevant authority in accor-
dance with the ISPS Code will be for the charterers’ account. This requirement is ir-
respective of the security level imposed in the particular port or area. Secondly, the 
Clause addresses the owners’ liabilities and makes it clear that the owners are ac-
countable for all measures taken to comply with the Ship Security Plan. For example, 
where the owners are required under their Ship Security Plan to place two guards at 
the gangway, even though the port security regulations require only one guard, such 
costs will be borne by the owners. The costs of preparing and implementing a Ship 
Security Plan for Levels 1, 2 and 3 are for the owners’ account.124 That provides a fair 
allocation of the responsibility of each party. After all, it is not the shipowner that de-
cides in which waters and ports the vessel operates. 
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Another problem arises, where a ship is ordered by the charterers to a non-
compliant port or port facility. One could argue that this constitutes a breach of the 
safe berth/safe port clause of the charter party, putting the liability on the charterer. 
Furthermore, the owner could claim damages; a charterer might incur liability under 
an implied indemnity in respect of employment between such ports. Also, where ship 
and port operate at different security levels, owners will have to consider whether 
they can refuse to comply with charterers’ order, if they are ordered to a port with a 
higher security level than that operating on board the ship. A port will not be safe 
unless in the relevant period of time the particular ship can reach it, use it and return 
from it without, in the absence of some normal occurrence, being exposed to danger 
which cannot be avoided by good navigation and seamanship.125 Certainly, a port is 
not principally exposed to danger only because it is in compliance with the ISPS 
Code. It should rather be determined on a case by case basis, whether it still would 
be reasonable to send a vessel to the particular port or not. For compliant ports, 
however, the ISPS Code defines in sec 2.1.11 security level 3 as a level where “…a 
security incident is probable or imminent…” Under such circumstances a port would 
indeed be exposed to danger and consequently unsafe. Even under security level 2 
that requires at least a “…heightened risk of a security incident…”126 it is arguable 
that a port is also deemed to be unsafe.127 On the other hand, the Code and the dif-
ferent levels were introduced in order to face these exposed dangers and countervail 
them. That would lead to the conclusion that the danger should be somehow equal-
ized by the measures following a higher security level, and thus the port cannot be 
considered as unsafe implicitly, but rather determined on a case by case basis, as 
well. However, it will be to the parties themselves to negotiate appropriate clauses 
that modify these problems and what the parties’ obligations are in the different situa-
tions, for example the requirement to nominate an alternative port etc.128 
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c) Voyage charterparties 
The voyage charter is a contract of affreightment for the carriage of goods re-
quiring space for one voyage or consecutive voyages. Voyage charterers are also in-
volved in the implications of the new security regime. The abovementioned require-
ment that a vessel is only to be ordered to a safe port falls under the employment and 
indemnity clause of most voyage charterparties, as well.129 The problem with ISPS 
compliant ports and security levels are corresponding. Additionally, there are various 
other concerns. 
Voyage charters depend very much on scheduled ship movements. These 
properly elaborated plans could be disturbed by security measures in ports, making 
movements harder and slower or increasing the time required entering the port. 
Since owners or demise charterers do not have direct control of the loading and the 
discharging of the cargo, the charterparties provide a time frame (laytime) to be put 
on the charterer’s operations. If this time frame is exceeded, the owner is entitled to 
claim demurrage as liquidated damages.130 It is questionable, however, how the se-
curity regime fits into this system of laytime and demurrage. What effect can security 
operation causing delays have on charterers? The concept of laytime is based on the 
‘arrived ship’. A ship is arrived, if it is ready to load and if a valid notice of readiness 
(NOR) is given.131 Both is possible under an often used WIBPON clause (whether in 
berth/port or not), as soon as the vessel is arrived at a customary waiting place, not 
necessarily within the harbour. If a port closes its waiting anchorage or in the event of 
access being denied to a contractual port there will be arguments as to if the ship is 
arrived. It is arguable, that these cases should be treated like the ones concerning 
congested ports. Ships with a WIBPON clause are considered to be arrived, although 
they are actually not able to discharge. On the other hand, that situation could rea-
sonably be attributed to ‘force majeure’ or ‘restraint of princes’, in which case the 
loss, and thus the laytime, would lie where it falls132, consequently upon the shi-
powner, causing that the ship would not considered to be arrived.                          
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Therefore, voyage charterparties need to be reconsidered in order to supple-
ment them with various security clauses. The BIMCO ISPS clause for voyage char-
terparties133 provide that   the owner shall be entitled to tender Notice of Readiness 
even if not cleared due to applicable security regulations or measures imposed by a 
port facility or any relevant authority under the ISPS Code.  Furthermore, any delay 
resulting from measures imposed by a port facility or by any relevant authority under 
the ISPS Code shall count as laytime or time on demurrage if the Vessel is on lay-
time or demurrage. If the delay occurs before laytime has started or after laytime or 
time on demurrage has ceased to count, it shall be compensated by the charterers at 
the demurrage rate. These clauses incorporate the possible effects of the new secu-
rity measures into the existing system of laytime that tries to balance owners and 
charterers interests. 
d) Insurance 
It is highly likely that the ISPS Code will be a requirement for valid insurance. 
As the ISM Code falls under the warranty that the assured shall at all times comply 
with statutory requirements relating to the safe operation of the ship134, the ISPS 
Code could match the same condition. Since the security measures adopted by IMO 
are part of SOLAS, a shipowner who is in breach of these measures is not compliant 
with SOLAS. However, compliance with SOLAS is mostly a requirement of insurance 
and has an impact on seaworthiness.  
But even if a ship is compliant this does not imply a full coverage of security 
risks. The insurance industry still tends to regard the risks associated with terrorist 
acts as coming under the heading of risks of war or armed conflict, where shipping is 
concerned. In fact, the terrorist risk would seem to be an every day risk and cannot 
be confined to specific geographical areas or to governmental action or military force, 
as may be possible in the case of war risk.135 Consequently, the insurance industry 
should, analysing the risks covered, separate the different types of risks. 
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II. Container Security 
While the described measures in the 1974 SOLAS Convention focus on port 
and vessel security primarily, a subject of at least equal concern is cargo and con-
tainer security in particular. Therefore, while adopting the amendments to SOLAS, 
the Conference, being aware of the competencies of the World Customs Organiza-
tion (WCO) since it is the only intergovernmental organization that has competence in 
customs matters, also adopted a resolution that invites the WCO to consider urgently 
measures to enhance security throughout international closed cargo transport units 
(CTUs) and request the Secretary-General of IMO to contribute expertise relating to 
maritime traffic to the discussions at the WCO. In this respect, the USA introduced 
unilateral protection measures, often anticipating the implementation of provisions 
being negotiated in international bodies like WCO and IMO. For this reason and in 
the background of the immense international trade to and from the U.S., the recent 
initiatives should be introduced.  
1. The C-TPAT 
The Customs-Trade Partnership Against Terrorism (C-TPAT)136 is a voluntary 
program or “partnership” between the trade industry and U.S. Customs to foster co-
operative relationships that strengthen security by controlling and protecting the in-
ternational supply chain of goods. This is one of several initiatives in an overall effort 
to “push back the borders” by encouraging those engaged in the carriage of goods to 
share information about the supply chain and to become involved in the effort to as-
sess the security risks posed.137 C-TPAT participation is open to brokers, manufac-
turers, warehouses, air carriers, sea carriers, land carriers, air freight consolidators, 
ocean transportation intermediaries, and non-vessel operating common carriers 
(NVOCCs),138 and it accordingly tries to cover the whole supply chain. Participants 
agree to conduct a comprehensive self-assessment of supply chain security using 
the C-TPAT security guidelines jointly developed by Customs and the trade commu-
nity, to ensure the integrity of their security practices and communicate their security 
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guidelines to their business partners within the chain. The emphasis is on prevention 
rather than detection as the best means of maintaining security. While it is a volun-
tary system and there is no monetary penalty for non-enrollment, various benefits of 
enrollment in the initiative include reduced exams, the assigning of an account man-
ager, and expedited processing.139 This in turn, should lead to fewer inspections, an 
attendant decrease in expense and delay in the C-TPAT member’s commercial un-
dertakings. 
2. CSI and the “24 hour rule” 
The Container Security Initiative (CSI) is related with C-TPAT – though it is a 
separate program – and also involves the customs. Under the CSI, the United States 
forms partnership with foreign governments to place U.S. Customs in foreign sea-
ports. Its main objective is to perform targeting and pre-screening operations at larger 
container ports in order to facilitate detection of security threats at the earliest possi-
ble moment and thus to push back the “zone of security” in the importation proc-
ess.140 This only is possible by means of a cooperative effort between the countries 
in whose jurisdiction the container ports are located. In general, the CSI program 
contains four core elements: 
• establishing security criteria to identify high-risk containers 
• pre-screening those containers identified as high-risk before they ar-
rive in U.S. ports  
• using technology to quickly pre-screen those containers 
• developing and using smart and secure tamper-proof containers141 
The system of container security is still a work in progress and is wholly de-
pendent upon the cooperation of foreign states and, of course, their local port and 
terminal officials. U.S. Customs has, however, realized much progress in obtaining 
the participation of foreign container ports in the CSI program.142 It also moved for-
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ward efforts towards developing an international approach. However, there were and 
still are serious misgivings about some attendant issues.  
Some of the EU member states with important sea ports were invited by the 
United States to join CSI. That included ports regarding certain criteria for trade vol-
ume and security level.143 However, the EU pushed to amend the existing U.S. – EU 
customs cooperation clarifying that arrangements between the U.S. and individual 
EU countries be made on a community wide level instead. In this respect, in 2002 the 
European Commission initiated infringement proceedings against the EU member 
states which have agreed to participate in the program.144 The EC argued that Euro-
pean ports that were not invited by the United States to join CSI, or did not meet cri-
teria for trade volume and security levels, could suffer if cargo from those ports is 
subjected to more time consuming inspections or even denied entry to shipments be-
cause they did not come from a trusted CSI port. Thus, cargo in containers subject to 
a CSI port is not treated in the same way as cargo from other ports. That places 
some ports at a potential competitive disadvantage if shippers diverted cargo to ports 
that could guarantee clearance.145 This would contravene the free movements of 
goods and the general principle of non-discrimination pursuant to Art. 7 of the Treaty 
Establishing the European Community.  
However, the European Union and the United States signed an agreement 
(April 22, 2004) that paves the way for rapidly expanding to more European ports. 
Any country that meets the joint EU-US eligibility requirements is eligible to volunteer 
for CSI. Having regained central control of security policy vis-à-vis the United States, 
the EC has dropped legal proceedings against member states that had refused to re-
nounce their CSI deals.146  
 
CSI has been complemented by the so called “24 hour rule” issued by U.S. 
Customs which, amongst other things, requires cargo details of goods being trans-
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ported to the United States to be transmitted by the sea carriers to customs 24 hours 
before loading. Furthermore, a separate list of all foreign cargo that is not destined for 
the United States that will remain on the vessel has to be issued. Thereby, in a very 
short space of time, major changes to long standing cargo acceptance procedures 
were introduced. Generally, cargo manifests were required to be submitted no later 
than 48 hours prior to the vessel’s arrival.147 It could be prepared en route based on 
the cargo actually loaded aboard the vessel. Now, in accordance to the “24 hour 
rule”, the shippers have to submit documentation several days prior to loading in or-
der to facilitate the issuance of bills of lading and timely preparation of the manifest. 
That, in turn, necessitates earlier delivery, requires more storage capacity and costs, 
and inevitably increases the risk of loss or damage. Thus, the possibility of “onboard” 
bills of lading will be curtailed and the ability of an ocean carrier to accept last minute 
or just in time cargo could be severely limited. Furthermore, customs could require 
inspection or issue a hold about cargo already loaded aboard the vessel and after the 
bill of lading has been issued. These uncertainties could cause disruptions in docu-
mentation procedures, loading and stowage operations, and potentially have an im-
pact on letter-of-credit financing.148 Beside these reservations, the new requirements 
might create a logistical nightmare for both, carriers and regulators. As an example, 
four different manifest filings would be required for vessels loading at four different 
ports prior to commencement of a voyage to the United States, even for cargo re-
maining on board. Thus it is not surprising that a number of shipping interests are 
concerned that customs may not have sufficient resources to adequately assess and 
pre-screen the manifests in a timely fashion.149 As a result, the rule might embody a 
costly procedure and enormous bureaucracy to provide information that cannot be 
evaluated. Moreover, there remains the question, whether the ship operators are the 
right person which this information should be obtained from, or if not the role of ex-
porters and importers should be emphasized that are often in a better position to 
supply cargo information. On the other hand, since the full enforcement in February 
                                            
147 International Chamber of Shipping ICF: Delivering Maritime Security, Key Issues 2004. 
http://www.marisec.org/ics-isfkeyissues2004/maritimesecuritytext.htm. 
148 Thomas J. Schoenbaum/ Jessica C. Langston: An All Hands Evolution: Port Security in the Wake 
of September 11th. 77 Tulane Law Review 2003, p. 1349. 
149 World Shipping Council, Comments of the World of Shipping Council before the United States Cus-
toms Service in the Matter of Advanced Cargo Manifest Proposed Rulemaking. See at 
http://www.worldshipping.org/customs_manifest_comments.pdf. 
 37
2003, the new procedures seem to have bedded in fairly well. Although there are 
problems in obtaining the data from the shippers in a timely manner, many container 
lines report benefits, the legal certainty provided by the rule reducing the scope for 
shippers to insist on placing last minute cargo and helping to eliminate inaccuracies 
in cargo documentation in this respect.150 Furthermore, the industry has accepted 
that it is better to have a suspicious box identified before the ship is at sea than to 
have the entire ship and cargo denied port entry.151    
3. International Measures 
As it was mentioned before, the initiatives in the United States were anticipat-
ing international procedures in respect of container security. The World Customs Or-
ganisation (WCO) adopted in response to the invitation of the IMO to the security 
process a resolution on Security and Facilitation of the International Trade Supply 
Chain. The resolution addresses a series of steps to protect the international trade 
supply chain from acts of terrorism and against being used for the illegal transport of 
goods for terrorist purposes.152 It takes account of the fact that customs administra-
tion are the ideal authorities to deal with the problem, because they are already key-
players in the supply chain, have the necessary risk management techniques to tar-
get high-risk consignments and the necessary equipment for control. The packages 
of measures include: 
• guidelines for Advanced Cargo Information to enable the pre-arrival 
electronic transmission of customs data153;  
• guidelines for cooperative arrangements between members and private 
industry to increase supply chain security and facilitate the flow of the 
international trade154; 
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• a new International Convention on Mutual Administrative Assistance in 
Custom Matters to assist members in developing a legal basis to en-
able the advanced electronic transmission of customs data 
• an amendment of the WCO data model to include the main elements 
necessary to detect high risk consignments.155  
WCO is currently working on further developments of supplementary instru-
ments for the implementation of the abovementioned major instruments, with a view 
of finalizing them by the end of 2004. The measures aim to include all parties in the 
supply chain in order to create a comprehensive system.  
4. Effects of the Initiatives 
Effects from the security initiatives concerning containers are of the same 
problematic nature as the difficulties with the SOLAS amendments. Their implemen-
tation can affect the relation between the owner and the charterer in respect of de-
lays and expenses. The following example reveals several problems: An ISPS com-
pliant vessel loads containers at a compliant facility in a country which has signed the 
US CSI. All containers bound for ports in the US have been either inspected or oth-
erwise cleared to the satisfaction of US Customs at the load port. On arrival in the 
US, the vessel is denied entry or delayed because a tip off has been received regard-
ing a container bound for the vessel’s next non-US port, which may not have been 
inspected by US Customs personnel at the load port. Assuming neither the owner nor 
the charterer has been culpable in this scenario, who, then, will bear the costs of 
such delay?156 That would very much depend on the charterparty.  
In time charterparties the employment of the vessel is solely the charterers’ 
prerogative. Therefore, all costs and expenses arising out of security regulations or 
measures in connection with the cargo will be for the charterers’ account. Conse-
quently, there would also be no possibility for a charterer to put a vessel off hire in re-
spect of such measures.  
In voyage chartererparties it is usually for the owners to comply with and pay 
for port related requirements and costs. However, the abovementioned security 
measures are cargo related and ought to be for the charterers’ account. That would 
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include time lost in obtaining entry and exit clearances, which is not attributable to the 
vessel, counting as laytime or time on demurrage and any expenses or additional 
fees relating to the cargo, even if levied against the vessel, being for the charterers’ 
account. Charterers might take recourse against any other party or the authorities for 
wrongfully detaining the vessel in the first place. It is questionable, however, if such a 
claim would prevail against the government’s sovereign immunity defence, particu-
larly when concern about national security precipitated the action. Furthermore, there 
could come up argument about a valid notice of readiness if a vessel is refused entry 
into port. The scenario equals the situation where port entry is refused because of 
ISPS related measures.157 To avoid confusion, a BIMCO clause proposes that notice 
of readiness may be tendered even when the vessel has not been cleared for entry 
by the authorities. This provision is designed to attempt to protect the owners against 
any arguments that the vessel is not legally ready although she is ready for all other 
purposes.158 
Another problem occurs where a charterer has signed the C-TPAT Agree-
ment, but the owner has not. Charterers would need the owners’ information in order 
to comply with their obligation and not to get in breach of it. However, an owner is not 
legally bound to provide the required details. Therefore, charterparties should con-
sider these obligations. 
Finally, the effect of the ’24 hour rule’ has to be looked at. Failure to provide 
the required information within 24 hours prior to loading may result in the delay of a 
permit being issued to discharge the cargo in the U.S. and/or even the assessment of 
penalties or claims for liquidated damages levied on the carrier by the U.S. Cus-
toms.159 However, the charterers are usually in a better position than the owners to 
obtain and assess the correctness of the information provided for the cargo. Never-
theless, there is no legal obligation for the charterers to present the information not 
later than 24 hours before lading. Thus, in order to protect carriers against the con-
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sequences of these new security measures, special clauses have to be incorporated 
into voyage and time charter parties, respectively.   
III. Security regarding Seafarers and Port Workers  
The IMO also adopted a resolution that invites the International Labour Or-
ganisation (ILO) to improve measures on a seafarers’ identity document and on com-
prehensive port security requirements beyond the port/ship interface of the ISPS 
Code.160 As a result, the ILO has approved the very rapid development of a new 
regulatory instrument which modifies the requirements of the existing ILO Seafarers’ 
Identity Documents Convention.161 The objective of the Convention is to ensure that 
a seafarer’s identity can be verified positively and minimize Seafarer hardship as a 
result through enhanced security combined with the necessary freedom of movement 
in the normal conduct of their profession.162 The formats of identity documents were 
to be more standardised, and the issuing procedures were to be tightened.163 In 
March 2004, the ILO Governing Body decided on the biometric standard that will be 
incorporated in ILO Convention. That standard is given by a finger minutiae-based 
biometric profile for the document.164 This program will be the first implementation of 
biometric technology (the ID card contains several physical data of the relevant per-
son, such as photograph, fingerprints, and other personal information for a database 
verification of authenticity) on a global scale that will address biometric template in-
teroperability. It is, however, still tested and not yet realised. Crucially, however, the 
Convention maintained the principle that port states must afford special treatment to 
seafarers for the purpose of facilitating shore leave or crew transits, and that seafar-
ers holding the new document should not normally be required to apply for a visa. A 
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system of identification, based upon a “smart identity card”, is already working well 
for the airline staff within the aviation industry. Immigration authorities respect and 
trust the air crew, while there remains a contrasting situation for ship crews.165 Hope-
fully that will change with the new regulations.  
Furthermore, joint work between the International Labour Organization and the 
International Maritime Organization (IMO) led to an overall security code for the 
whole port area. The objective of this Code of Practice on security in ports166 is to 
enable governments, employers, workers and other stakeholders to reduce the risk to 
ports from the threat posed by unlawful acts. The code provides a guidance frame-
work to develop and implement a port security strategy appropriate to identified 
threats to security like the ISPS Code. However, it is not intended to replace the ISPS 
Code. It extends the consideration of port security beyond the area of the ship/port 
facility into the whole port. This code of practice is not a legally binding instrument 
and is not intended to replace national laws and regulations. It just functions as a 
guideline in order to harmonise the whole security system. 
IV. Ownership 
Another issue that had to be taken into account by a comprehensive security 
regime is the identification of ship operators with regard to the lack of transparency in 
shipping so far. In this respect the SOLAS provides some requirements that are 
aimed to lift the veil behind the control and management of vessels. SOLAS XI-1 
Regulation 5 states that every ship must maintain a ‘Continuous Synopsis Record’ of 
the vessel’s history, ownership and employment. It requires the master to have con-
tinuous access to the following information: 
• Who appoints the crew? 
• Who are the parties to any charterparty? 
• Who decides the employment of the ship? 
There should be no difficulties to identify the person or the manning company 
who decides which seamen are signed on and off. However, practical problems arise 
for ferries, cruiseships and other vessels with a large ‘hotel’ function. Nevertheless, 
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this should remain an administrative problem and shall not hinder from the aim of the 
regulation.  
Equally, it will not be too difficult to identify the parties to any charterparty. It is, 
however, quite usual to provide the charterer with the liberty to sub-charter the ves-
sel. In order to be able to comply with the SOLAS requirements the owner must en-
sure there is a sub-charter requirement in their charterparties for immediate notifica-
tion of all sub-charterers.  
The third requirement seems to be a bigger problem. The code is looking for a 
person who decides the employment of a ship. For a voyage charter this will probably 
be the charterer. However, problems arise, where a vessel is used by a time char-
terer, or as a tramping ship, or for cargo that is traded during a voyage. That makes 
an identification of employment much more difficult. Similarly, the required identifica-
tion for an oil tanker fixed to carry one or more parcels which are traded during a 
voyage could change more than once. The range of this provision is not conclusively 
clear. However, charterparties will have to be amended to provide for this information 
to be available and updated throughout the fixture and should contain an indemnity 
for non-compliance.167         
It has to be seen, how effective these provisions will work. If such a continuous 
record can be properly enforced, it would certainly not only benefit to security in ship-
ping. It will also complement the ISM Code and thus contribute to the safety at sea by 
unravelling employment and ownership and consequently responsibilities in shipping. 
Furthermore, the disclosure of beneficial ownership would impede potential money 
laundering regimes in the world of shipping. 
  
F. Cargo Loss or Damage in the Light of the New Security Regime 
Having outlined the major developments to date concerning maritime security 
and their direct impact on shipowners and charterers, the consequences for the car-
riage of goods by sea in respect of cargo loss and damage should be considered.  
One of the primary duties of an ocean carrier including his agents and ser-
vants is to protect the vessel and the cargo. Yet security as a means to protect both 
is not an unfamiliar concept. Piracy, for example, has always been a threat to com-
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mercial shipping. Liability for failure to provide adequate security measures has been 
interposed in the contexts of theft, stowaways and unexplained loss. Accordingly, in a 
case where valuables were to be carried on board the ship, it was held that they 
should have been stowed in a manner ‘reasonably fit to keep out a thief’.168 That im-
poses a heightened standard of care to ocean carriers for foreseeable and prevent-
able situations. The new security regime dictated by national and international initia-
tives might lead to the conclusion that it no longer may be assumed that acts 
imperilling the security of ship and cargo are unforeseeable or unpreventable by the 
carrier. Furthermore, the documentary procedures and activities on the part of the 
shipowners and charterers in the form of detailed vulnerability assessments and se-
curity plans, increased surveillance and monitoring, crew identity cards will be an in-
crease in relevant information for discovery purposes.169   
I. Principles of the Hague-Visby Rules 
The Hague-Visby Rules170 (HVR) remain the dominant carriage regime171 and 
they are components of many carriage contracts as well as of carriage regimes in 
domestic legislation172. Therefore, the impact of the security measures on these rules 
shall be analysed in the following. 
 Under the Hague-Visby Rules, an owner of cargo can establish a prima facie 
case of the carrier’s liability regarding loss or damage by establishing that the cargo 
was delivered to the carrier in good order and condition and turned out damaged or 
short. Evidence can be provided by an appropriate bill of lading according to Art. III 
(4) HVR. Once shown, the carrier is held liable, unless he is able to proof that the 
cause of the loss was not caused by his negligence. In this respect, the rules provide 
two main obligations to the carrier.  
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Under Art. III (1) HVR the carrier has inter alia to exercise due diligence to 
make the ship seaworthy and to properly man, equip and supply the ship at the in-
ception of the voyage. This requirement is considered as the carrier’s ‘first base’ obli-
gation.173 Unless the carrier is able to deny an allegation of a causative unseaworthi-
ness due to the lack of due diligence on his behalf, an exception of his liability 
pursuant to the rules will generally not be available to him, and he will consequently 
lose his defences.174 Seaworthiness is not only to be seen in the context of sailing 
from her port of departure to her port of destination, but must also include the suitabil-
ity in respect of the cargo, what is often described as the cargoworthiness of a ves-
sel. The undertaking is not an absolute one, but subject to due diligence of the car-
rier. This requirement comprises a standard of care regarding a certain degree of 
reasonable foreseeability and adequacy of specific measures. 
The ‘second base’ obligation of the carrier is according to Art. III (2) HVR that 
he should “…properly and carefully load, handle, stow, carry, keep, care for and dis-
charge the goods carried.” This obligation is, however, subject to Art. IV HVR that 
provides for the carrier certain exclusions of his liability and his ability to limit. This ar-
ticle entails an obligation which may overlap the concept of seaworthiness and espe-
cially cargoworthiness, but also goes much beyond them.175 It is therefore not always 
easy to determine, whether an exception can be invoked or not.  
II. The Effect of the New Security Regime on the Rules    
There is nearly an infinite range of possibilities for acts of terrorism and secu-
rity related threats involving the carriage of goods during every stage of the carriage 
from before loading until after discharge and delivery. However, it would be impossi-
ble to cover every potential scenario, since the slightest change in circumstances 
might well affect the rights and liabilities of the parties. In the following only a general 
analyse will be made in order to figure out the main problems as a starting point for 
specific cases. 
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1. ‘First Base’ Obligation 
The requirement of due diligence has changed, since the new security regime 
was introduced to shipping. On one hand, the awareness of security threats has in-
creased tremendously. That has an effect on the standard of care and specific meas-
ures taken by the carrier. Increased awareness to all parties will make the task more 
difficult for the carrier to show that an event was unforeseeable and his due diligence 
regarding requisite security provisions followed the risk. The onus of proof will be to 
the carrier that the loss or damage was not caused by the want of due diligence. 176 
Regarding an armed robbery a court held in Tokio Marine Management v. M/V Zim 
Tokyo177 that the event was not unforeseeable even no such crimes had been ex-
perienced in the past. “…[I]f the risk is more than merely conceivable and the gravity 
of the potential harm is of sufficient magnitude, the law will still place upon defen-
dants a duty to provide against the contingency.”178 Exactly how much caution de-
fendants must exercise has to be determined on a case-to-case basis; the higher the 
security level, the higher the standard of care. And it will again be to the carrier to 
proof that he followed the measures indicated in his ship security plan.  
As for what constitutes seaworthiness, it will have to be tested against mini-
mum standards adopted in the ISPS Code.179 Compliance will certainly be a prereq-
uisite for a ship to be seaworthy. Furthermore, the ship security plan, even if licensed 
by the authority, must contain appropriate measures, and the ship security officer 
must be properly instructed and trained; if they proof not to be adequate, seaworthi-
ness would fail and the due diligence question would arise again. The burdens of 
proof, however, are critical, especially where the actual cause of loss is in question.  
2. ‘Second Base’ Obligation             
If the damage or loss was caused by a breach of the carrier’s duty in accor-
dance with Art. III (2) HVR and he is compliant with the ‘first base’ obligation, he 
could invoke exclusions of his liability provided in Art. IV HVR. The relevant exception 
clauses in respect of maritime security will be regarded in the following. 
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a) Error in Management 
According to Art. IV (2)(a) HVR the carrier could raise the potential defence of 
error in management. Prerequisite is, however, that the error is related to the man-
agement of the ship and not to the care and custody of the cargo. The latter would 
rather be an Art. III (2) failure than an excepted peril.180 Thus cargo might argue that 
the crew’s failure to detect or prevent the unlawful act that harmed the cargo consti-
tutes a failure to care for the cargo. On the other hand, one could argue that any 
lapse to notice, prevent, or guard against an act of terrorism serves as an error asso-
ciated with the protection of the vessel. When the actions of the crew affect both ves-
sel and cargo, the ‘primary purpose’ test was applied to ascertain whether the opera-
tion was conducted in the interests of the vessel or the cargo.181 That has to be 
determined for each case individually. However, there is a good assumption that a 
shipowner in the first instance is interested to protect the ship by taking security re-
lated measures. That would give the carrier the possibility to invoke the exception, 
but the line to draw is very fine and shaky. Moreover, the error in management ex-
emption remains unpopular and is likely to fall away in future carriage regimes.182 
There is reasonable reluctance to excuse a carrier from the negligence of its own 
employees. Furthermore, the failure could also be interpreted as a failure by the car-
rier to exercise due diligence to make the vessel seaworthy in respect of the ship se-
curity plan or the training of the crew.183 Thus, by raising the exception the carrier 
could cut off his own nose. 
b) Act of War/ Act of Public Enemies 
The act of war and act of public enemy defences (Art. IV (2)(e),(f) HVR) could 
give the carrier another possibility to limit or avoid his liability. However, a strong ar-
gument exists that acts of war do not encompass types of terror. Acts of war require 
governmental action or military force, or something in nature of rebellion or revolu-
tion, both of which are domestic matters.184 Terrorism does usually not have its origin 
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in governmental action or military force, and is mostly used as an international in-
strument. Hence this exception will not help the carrier in most of the cases.  
The defence of acts of public enemies traditionally applies to an actual state of 
war between the government of a foreign nation and the carrier’s government.185 The 
requirement of another government involved would also exclude most of the cases of 
terrorism. Furthermore, the defence specifically refers to enemies of the shipowner’s 
sovereign. Considering that the carrier would have the burden of proof, and the iden-
tity /nationality of terrorist may be unknown, and the ship may not be chosen just be-
cause of its flag, the defence would be in most instances difficult to prove and unsuc-
cessful. 
c) Fire Defence 
The fire defence of Art. IV (2)(b) HVR may be invoked if the fire is not caused 
by the actual fault or privity of the carrier. The onus of establishing actual fault or priv-
ity falls on the cargo claimant.186 He has to prove that the owner either caused the 
fire or hindered its proper extinguishment in order to avoid the carrier’s exemption. 
The security initiatives require the direct involvement of the owner in appointing com-
pany security officers and drafting and implementing security plans. These should 
also consider fire emergencies and thus could indicate negligence when security 
measures are deficient in respect to the detection or prevention of terrorism involving 
fire.187   
d) Any Other Cause 
Finally, the carrier could raise the apparently very broad defence of Art. IV 
(2)(q) HVR in respect of “any other cause”. This so-called ‘catch-all’ exemption de-
pends upon the absence of actual fault or privity of the carrier, to be proved explicitly 
by the carrier. Thus it has to be shown that the carrier including the servants were 
completely without fault. There is a good chance that cargo could demonstrate that 
the carrier was negligent in designing or implementing security procedures to deter 
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terrorism. Thus the carrier is charged with the burden of establishing that he did all 
that in these circumstances a reasonable prudent owner would have done to protect 
cargo and ship from a terrorist act and that damage happened despite these efforts. 
This burden will be a heavy one in the light of the new awareness and the security 
requirements sweeping the maritime industry. 
e) Restraint of Princes 
The rules do not make any direct reference to delay. Nevertheless, courts to 
some degree recognize damages if they are consequences of the improper delay.188 
Hence a delay resulted from security related actions of the U.S. Customs or other 
governmental entities might cause a liability of the carrier. However, if not a liberty 
clause already releases the carrier from damages for delays, the ‘restraint of princes’ 
defence of Art. IV (2)(g) HVR will relieve the carrier from liability. 
                       
G. Conclusion 
Maritime security has been redefined in the 21st century with tremendous 
speed. Although the measures taken are widely spread in all corners of maritime law, 
a comprehensive system - that is, however, still in an early stage - has been devel-
oped in order to respond to the latest terrorist incidents. The mixture of international 
and domestic law with several agencies involved illustrate that the new security re-
gime is and will continue to be “an all hands evolution”.189 The ultimate effect of the 
various initiatives upon world trade and maritime commerce remain uncertain. It is 
certain, however, that the new measures will have their price. According to estimates 
in an OECD report, an initial investment by ship operators of at least US$ 1.3 billion 
will be required, and annual operating costs will increase by US$ 730 million thereaf-
ter.190 On the other hand, the report concludes that the potential costs of a major, well 
coordinated terror attack would likely be measured in the tens of billions of dollars. If 
such an attack would really occur is not sure, but it is not in the ambit of this work to 
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judge about assessments of potential disasters. It should be left to the industry and to 
politics whether shipping is able to bear this additional burden. However, beside the 
additional costs, it is also important to stress the advantages of the new regime. The 
measures will undoubtedly have beneficial effects in terms of the protection of port 
and marine professionals, and passengers as well, and also have indirect repercus-
sions in terms of action to combat all forms of trafficking, and concerning taxation and 
the secure routing of freight transported.191 Moreover, improved scanning, tracking of 
container seals, and an overall increase in security measures could well reduce the 
number of claims for shortage and theft/pilferage. Finally, the new level of transpar-
ency of operation will make it possible to organize them better and programme them 
over time for the benefit of all efficient and honest operators. 
Naturally, the new regime will take its time to get completely implemented by 
all related parties, especially when it was adopted in such a short time. The imple-
mentation concerns state actions, but also the relation between the owner and the 
charterer as well as the relation between the shipper and the carrier. They will get 
aware of the new standards and adapt their contracts and behaviours in order to pro-
tect vessel and cargo from nowadays more foreseeable or at least more assessable 
risks. The main effect and benefit will eventually be that every party involved in the 
security system will become aware of security problems and thus will act more con-
scious in all respects. 
           
 
 
                                            
191 European Commission: Preparatory Acts. Enhancing Maritime Transport Security, 2003. 
http://www.lexis-nexis.com/professional/, giving an example: While the installation of container scan-
ners in the Port of Rotterdam cost € 15 million, in one year their use generated € 88 million in cus-
tom and tax revenue, even though only 2% of the containers are subject to such checks. 
